The New Classical Explanation of the Stagflation: A Psychological Way of Thinking by Goutsmedt, Aurélien
The New Classical Explanation of the Stagflation: A
Psychological Way of Thinking
Aure´lien Goutsmedt
To cite this version:
Aure´lien Goutsmedt. The New Classical Explanation of the Stagflation: A Psychological Way
of Thinking. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2016.18 - ISSN :
1955-611X. 2016. <halshs-01281962>
HAL Id: halshs-01281962
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01281962
Submitted on 3 Mar 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The New Classical Explanation of the Stagflation: 
A Psychological Way of Thinking 
 
Aurélien GOUTSMEDT 
 
2016.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
The New Classical Explanation of the
Stagﬂation: A Psychological Way of Thinking
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Abstract
The stagﬂation phenomenon is regarded as one of the cause of
the Keynesian paradigm breakdown in the 1970s. The New Classical
school took advantage of this breakdown. However, its discourse on
the stagﬂation was not so clear and remained in a implicit shape. The
paper aim at rebuilding the New Classical tale of the stagﬂation that
stroke the United-States economy in the 1970s. We show that psycho-
logical ideas (expectations, beliefs, credibility) lay in the heart of the
explanation. In the same time, oil shocks were left in the background.
Besides, the New Classical school put much more emphasis on the in-
ﬂation issue and experienced some diﬃculties to deal with the increase
in unemployment.
Keywords: History of Macroeconomics; Macroeconomics; New Classical
School; Stagﬂation.
JEL codes: B220; E320; E520; N120.
PRELIMINARY VERSION - DO NOT CITE
Introduction
It is not striking to consider macroeconomics as one of the subdisciplines
within economics that is the most permeable to the current economic con-
text. Ever since its own birth during the Great Depression, macroeconomics
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had made proof of the permeability of its borders, which render the discipline
more susceptible of being attacked during times of crisis. This is, for instance,
what economists think happened during the 1970s when `the economic prob-
lems of the [decade] brought the Keynesian bandwagon to an abrupt (...)
halt' (Snowdon and Vane, 2005, p.18)1. `Stagﬂation' was a phenomenon that
economists had never seen before the 1970s. This phenomenon was charac-
terized by a situation of economic stagnation combined with both a high rate
of unemployment and a high rate of inﬂation. This unprecedented economic
context in United-States casted the doubt on the existence of a negative re-
lationship between inﬂation and unemployment  the Phillips Curve2. The
Keynesian paradigm was accused of being unable to explain the stagﬂation,
striking hard on the bases of its domination.
The New Classical challenge of Keynesian orthodoxy in the 1970s was di-
rected on two fronts. First, the Keynesian paradigm was attacked for its lack
of microfoundations and for the use of ad hoc assumptions  such as money
illusion or wage rigidity. The other target was the empirical weakness of Key-
nesian macroeconomics. However, when one ask for macroeconomists what
Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent and others has brought to macroeconomics,
they usually underline the theoretical improvements. Yet, if the New Classi-
cal authors succeeded in transforming their oﬀensive into a `revolution', one
can suppose that it is because they had some concrete economic explanations
to oﬀer that would explain the stagﬂation phenomenon.
Paradoxically, the more comprehensive stories of the stagﬂation published
in the 1970s and the early 1980s have to be found in Keynesian contributions3.
Such contributions do not exist on the New Classical side but that does not
mean they said nothing on the economic situation of the 1970s. Consequently,
the aim of this paper is to rebuild the New Classical narrative on stagﬂation.
To do so, I extract from the New Classical models some important elements
1 For example, Pedro Garcia Duarte also defends the point when he explains that `the
stagﬂation of the 1970s made economists question the ability of the Keynesian device
to incorporate inﬂation into their IS-LM framework' (Duarte, 2012, p.196). Lucas did
not say something diﬀerent in its interview with Brian Snowdon and Howard Vane :
The main ideas that are associated with rational expectations were de-
veloped by the early 1970s so the importance of the inﬂation that occurred
was that it conﬁrmed some of these theoretical ideas. In a way the timing
couldn't have been better. (Snowdon and Vane, 1998, p.122)
2 On the ambiguity of the label `Phillips Curve' and on its place in the Keynesian
paradigm, see Forder (2014) and Hoover (2015).
3 See for instance the well documented book of Blinder (1979),Economic Policy and the
Great Stagﬂation, or Solow (1980). See also the book of Bruno and Sachs (1985).
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accounting for the simultaneous increase in both the inﬂation rate and the
unemployment rate.
This construction of the narrative is useful for, at least, three reasons.
First, the battles between economist in the public sphere converged to the
stagﬂation issue. In Newsweek (28 April 1980), Samuelson blamed the New
Classical school for being too `optimistic that inﬂation can be wiped out with
little pain' (see Sargent 2013, p.39), whereas in the New York Times, Mark
Willes (1978), president of the District FED of Minneapolis (the stronghold
of the New Classical school in the Federal Reserve System), claimed the ne-
cessity of making the disinﬂation policy more credible, in order to reduce the
cost of such a policy. McGregor and Young (2013, pp.177-186) showed how,
during the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, Mark Willes
defended the Rational Expectations framework to understand what was at
stake in the 1970s. One cannot regard the New Classical ideas as pure ab-
stract concepts that do not say anything about the `real world'. Their ideas
were recovered and used to bring an explanation of economic disturbances in
the 1970s. That is why making clear to which explanation Rational Expec-
tations models gave birth is useful.
Second, the contributions of the New Classical economists represent an
inspiration for one of the dominant explanations of the stagﬂation today,
that we usually labeled as the `Ideas Hypothesis'. Following Cristina Romer
`economic ideas [in the 1970s] were the key source of the Great Inﬂation'
because `both monetary and ﬁscal policymakers were constrained or driven
by the misguided economic framework of the time' (Romer, 2005, p.177)4.
The study of the work of Lucas, Sargent, or Kydland and Prescott enable to
understand the genesis of such a type of explanation.
Third, this narrative reconstruction is a way to replace the New Classical
school within the economic context that has accompanied its development.
Knowing the inﬂuence of New Classical ideas on today macroeconomics, there
is no doubt that the economic situation of the 1970s had an important ef-
fect on the shape of the discipline, which is still visible in the present state
of macroeconomics. DeLong (1997) shows how the Great Depression has
haunted macroeconomists and policymakers for many years, until the stagﬂa-
tion upstaged macroeconomists' emphasis on unemployment, giving way to
a stronger sensibility for inﬂation issues.
To clarify the New Classical views and the questions that a New Classical
`theory' of stagﬂation should answer to, I begin by presenting some of the
most important economic facts of the 1970s. In a second time, I show what
4 Contributions in the same direction could be found in Romer and Romer (2002b,a,
2004), Orphanides (2003) or Nelson (2005)
3
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Figure 1: Inﬂation and unemployment in the United-States in the 1970s
is the fundamental cause of stagﬂation for the New Classical economists
and what are the channels of transmission from this fundamental cause to
the increase of inﬂation and unemployment. Third, I describe what would
be the concrete political program that NC economists proposed (more or
less explicitly) to deal with the turbulent 1970s period. Finally, I underline
that two variables were scarcely concerned by New Classical economists:
the general trend of unemployment and supply shocks (more precisely, oil
shocks).
1 What are the facts to explain?
For most of the industrialized countries the 1970s represent a break with
the `Golden Ages' of the two preceding decades. The 1970s are the decade
when inﬂation was the highest in the whole XXth century. However, what
really stroke economists was the collapse of the negative relationship between
inﬂation and the rate of unemployment, which was regarded by many as a
crucial component of the Keynesian framework.
Figure 1 clearly shows the break in the relationship. Until 1980, before
the Volcker deﬂation and the rebirth of a negative relationship, the cor-
relation is rather positive : inﬂation and unemployment increase together.
4
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Figure 2: Change of the real GDP and inﬂation in the United-States in the
1970s
Unemployment lags behind inﬂation and rises strongly during the recession
periods (shaded areas in the graph). Figure 2 shows that during the 1970s
prices were not procyclical. During the 1970s the inﬂation rate presents three
peaks: 1970 (6,5%), 1974 (12,3%) and 1980 (14,8%). The last two are by far
the highest peaks. A recession is associated with each peak, being that be-
tween 1973-74 the longest and the deepest recession of the decade. Inﬂation
seems to lead slightly the cycle. The question is then, why was the usual
correlation between the inﬂation and the unemployment rate reversed.
The layman's conception of the disturbances in the 1970s is based on the
events occurred in the middle east during these years and on the oil shocks.
Before 1973, the price of oil in the United-States was rather stable, mainly
for one simple reason: the production was domestic and the price was ﬁxed
by the Texas Railroad Commission (Galbraith, 2014, p.31). With the peak
oil reached at the end of the 1960s, the United-States economy was forced to
import more and more oil from other countries5. This increased the United
States vulnerability to price ﬂuctuations. In October 1973, OPEC countries
5 The marginal extraction ﬂow of the oil well decreases with the reduction of the stock
in the well. We talk about a peak oil when this threshold is reached by the majority of
the wells, leading to a reduction in the oil extraction growth.
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Figure 3: Oil Price in the United States in the 1970s
renegotiated the `posted price' of oil with the oil companies6. After failing
to reach an arrangement, OPEC decided on October 16 to unilaterally rise
the posted price by 70 percent. On October 17, the Arab states announced
a reduction of the oil supply for the US, in reaction to the conﬂict between
Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other. This situation
produced the ﬁrst oil shock7. The second oil shock followed the islamic
revolution in Iran in 1979, and the conﬂict between Iran and Irak the next
year.
However, if we refer to the oil shocks as a major fundamental cause of
the stagﬂation, it remains to answer two questions8. First, what explains the
ﬁrst inﬂation peak at the very end of the 1960s? Then, how could one justify
the persistence in inﬂation after the temporary shock ? As I will show later,
New Classical economists (and monetarists) referred to economic policies as
responsible of the rise in inﬂation.
6 The posted price was the price that serves to calculate the rate at which OPEC countries
tax oil companies
7 See Mitchell (2013, chapter 7) for a detailed account of the oil shocks and the confusion
between the renegotiation by OPEC countries and the embargo by some Arab states.
8 In a more general way, we could talk of supply shocks, because oil was not the only
commodity which experienced a strong increase in its price. Blinder (1979, chapter3)
underlined the role played by food prices following bad harvests?
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Figure 4: Inﬂation, change in Monetary Base and in M2 in the United-States
in the 1970s
The Figure 4 shows the features of both the monetary base created by
the Federal Reserve, and the money stock M2 for the United States. The
Monetary Base seems to lead inﬂation during the peak in the increase of
prices, even if this movement is less clear for the second peak, in 1973-1974.
Concerning the third variable, no clear pattern emerges between inﬂation
and the monetary aggregate M2.
In Figure 5, we replace M2 by the Federal surplus/deﬁcit in percent of
GDP. First, the three great increases of the Federal deﬁcit came after inﬂation
had started to rise at the beginning of the three peaks. In addition to this,
there is no apparent relationship between deﬁcit and Monetary Base  the
increase of public deﬁcits does not seem to have led to a patent increase in
M0 in order to fund this increase.
Of course, the purpose above is rather vague and a more detailed and
technical analysis would be necessary to draw any conclusion. And yet, these
graphs by themselves might provide a good ﬁrst general impression of what
was going on in the 1970s with the US economy. Besides I intentionally leave
aside several variables, like wages or exchange rate, to simplify the picture
we have sketched.
After exposing some of the major facts of the period, now it is time to
7
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.18
Figure 5: Inﬂation, change in Monetary Base and federal deﬁcit in the
United-States in the 1970s
describe the questions that a theory of stagﬂation should answer. The ﬁrst
essential issue is to target the fundamental cause of the simultaneous increase
in unemployment and inﬂation. What is the initiating event or the `trigger
component' of the disturbances of the 1970s? Is there a particular context in
the labor market? Or are supply shocks the main factors? Or is it a question
of economic policies? Are ﬁscal and/or monetary policies guilty? The last
solution seems to be the preferred explanation for New Classical economists.
Then, an explanation of the stagﬂation must describe by which mecha-
nisms the fundamental cause has led to an increase in unemployment and
inﬂation. What is the channel of transmission between this ﬁrst impulse and
the poor outcome of U.S. economy in the 1970s? I will show that expecta-
tions played a crucial role for New Classical economists to understand the
stagﬂation phenomenon.
Deﬁning the fundamental cause and the channel of transmission implies
explaining why some other causes are considered as secondary or insigniﬁcant,
and why some other economic mechanisms that would link the fundamental
cause and stagﬂation are excluded.
Finally, as a part of the explanation is in the solution you propose to cure
the disease, the study of the treatment recommended enables to gain further
8
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insights into the diagnosis.
Two preliminary remarks are required before going into the details of the
New Classical explanations of stagﬂation. First, I deliberately exclude inter-
national issue related with the value of the dollar and with the disturbances
engendered by the shift in the regime of exchange rates. I made this choice
not only to limit the length of the paper, but also because New Classical
models has generally left this issue aside. This choice might be more easily
justiﬁed to analyze the U.S. economy in particular, because one talks about
a big country. Besides, the addition of international economic considerations
does not seem to inﬂect seriously the New Classical explanation.
Second, I have chosen to focus on the contributions of the major New
Classical economists, published in the 1970s or the early 1980s. I have payed
attention to three types of contributions: the work of Robert Lucas (1972,
1976) around the signal extraction problem and the Lucas Critique; the work
of Thomas Sargent (1982, 2013) on the theory of inﬂation and disinﬂation
policies; the contributions on time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott,
1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b). It seemed reasonable to talk about a
New Classical tale. Even if Lucas, Sargent or Barro did not always focus on
the same point, or did not defend exactly the same set of ideas, what pre-
vails is a solid consistency in the global narrative, mainly around the Rational
Expectations hypothesis.
In what follows, I discuss separately the diﬀerent types of models because
each of them brings some original features. The addition of them makes it
possible to rebuild a global story of the 1970s stagﬂation.
2 Explaining stagﬂation: which fundamental
cause and which channel of transmission?
Even if the New Classical school has deeply renewed the way of think
about inﬂation, their arguments belong to a well deﬁned faction. Generally
speaking, one can consider that inﬂation can have two origins  see for ex-
ample Gordon (1976). On the one hand, inﬂation can be `cost pushed'. A
strong market power on the Unions side is likely to push wages higher. More
generally, an increase in production costs can originate from any `struggle for
income shares among any set of subgroups in society' (Gordon, 1976, p.188).
On the other hand, there is the `Demand Pull' theory. In standard Key-
nesian theory inﬂation is demand pulled. However monetary factors do not
play any role in causing inﬂation. On the contrary, for Milton Friedman and
other monetarist economists, the Quantity Theory of Money is at the heart
9
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of a monetary demand pull theory. It was this line of thought that New
Classical economists followed. For them, monetary creation is the point of
departure of every inﬂation phenomenon. As I will illustrate with the models
displayed later, expansionist monetary policies are regarded as the point of
departure of prices take-oﬀ.
The questions remaining are concerned with the justiﬁcation of these
monetary policies and with their consequences in inﬂation and unemploy-
ment. Concerning the question of transmission the 1970s opposed two points
of view, well summarized by Tobin (1980a, p.789):
the main practical controversy of the day is to what extent, if
any, the ongoing inﬂation is inertial  i.e., reﬂects sluggishness in
the adjustment of paths of nominal wages and prices  as well as
expectational.
The same opposition is to be found in Robert J.Gordon (2011) discussion
of the two roads followed by the Phillips Curve after 1975. On the one hand, a
Keynesian approach  defended mainly by Gordon  advocated that inﬂation
is an inertial phenomenon that depends on past inﬂation:
the role of past inﬂation is not limited to the formation of ex-
pectations, but also includes a pure persistence eﬀect due to ﬁxed-
duration wage and price contracts, and lags between changes in
crude materials and ﬁnal product prices. Inﬂation is dislodged
from its past inertial values by demand and supply shocks. (Gor-
don, 2011, pp.10-11)
Sargent referred to this point of view as `momentum' or `core inﬂation'
theories (Sargent, 1983)9. The dynamic movements of prices are diﬀerent
in the Rational Expectations faction. What is characteristic of this theory
is `the absence of inertia, the exclusion of any explicit treatment of supply
shock variables, the ability of expected inﬂation to jump in response to new
information' (Gordon, 2011, p.11). The capacity of expectations `to jump'
is a crucial feature of New Classical models and explained for example that
disinﬂation policies can be costless: if private agents appraised such a policy
credible, they adjust consequently their inﬂation expectations downwards,
enabling for a reduction in inﬂation without any increase in unemployment10.
9 The `core inﬂation' concept was developed by Otto Eckstein (1981), which deﬁned it as
`the price of aggregate supply' or `the cost of the factors of production'. In a statistical
sense, core inﬂation corresponds `to `underlying inﬂation' (the portion of overall inﬂation
that is free from transitory inﬂuences) or to a measure of the common trend in all prices'
(Lebow and Rudd, 2008).
10 I will go back in more details on this mechanism in the next section on economic policy
questions.
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It is on the second approach that the paper focuses. In this section, I focus
on Lucas's contributions to analyze the role of intertemporal substitution and
agents' reaction in case of a change in the policy regime. Then, I will analyze
the way Sargent integrated expectations in the deﬁnition of inﬂation. Finally,
I direct attention to the time inconsistency question, raised by Kydland and
Prescott, which is at the heart of an `inﬂationary bias'.
2.1 The role of expectations for Robert Lucas
Even if he played without any doubt the leading role in the change that
occurred in macroeconomics in the 1970s, Robert Lucas never oﬀered a sys-
tematic and comprehensive story of the economic events of the period. How-
ever, as his work was focused on the interpretation of the Phillips curve and
on the role that monetary policy could perform, some lines of interpretation
can be drawn to clarify his position on stagﬂation. Lucas's major input to
the discussion was deﬁnitely his emphasis on the role that expectations play
in the economic mechanisms.
The Lucas and Rapping (1969) model represents a good point of departure
to understand the place held by expectations. Their aim was to reinterpret
the Phillips Curve as an equilibrium phenomenon on the labor market. They
used a utility function in which workers substitute current and future leisure.
In the case of a temporary increase of the current real wage, the normal real
wage stays the same and workers are likely to work more today in order to
take advantage of this increase and to maximize their own utility function.
If they face a permanent phenomenon, no substitution eﬀect takes place
(an income eﬀect is possible but it is treated as unimportant by Lucas and
Rapping). In this framework, transient ﬂuctuations in the real wage could
cause workers to substitute leisure today for leisure tomorrow, and so it
explains ﬂuctuations in total employment. The dynamics of employment
which is the consequence of intertemporal substitution depends on the utility
maximization and on how agents perceive a change in real wage.
This issue of perception was extended in Lucas (1972). Lucas wanted to
bring together the existence of a downward sloping Phillips Curve and the
neutrality of money without appealing to money illusion, as Friedman (1968)
was forced to do. Lucas rejected the short-term long-term split of Friedman,
for a separation between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policies.
In the case when agents have Rational Expectations and if information is
perfect, monetary policy cannot have any real eﬀect, and the Phillips Curve
is vertical  Unemployment stays at its natural rate and any increase in
monetary creation, because it is anticipated, is inﬂationary. But if agents
make no systematic mistake as in the model of Friedman, how is it possible
11
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to explain the existence of a negative relationship between unemployment
and inﬂation?
Lucas introduced some imperfection in information. Economic agents can
observe their own price (for example, wage for workers), but are unable to
know the current general price level before the next period. If they face an
increase in their relative price, they must assess which part of this increase
really concerns the relative price, and which part is the consequence of a
general increase of prices, following a monetary expansion  this is called a
`signal extraction problem'. Thus, this model displays an inverse relation-
ship between inﬂation and unemployment for two reasons. First, output and
employment react to changes in relative prices11. Second, an increase in the
general level of prices can be partially perceived by some producers and work-
ers as an increase in their relative prices, what pushes them to produce/work
more. In other words, if an expansionist monetary policy is unanticipated,
the general price increase that follows will be interpreted by each agent as
an augmentation of relative prices. Consequently, monetary policy will have
real eﬀect, increasing output and employment12.
The question is how do agents determine what is the current general price
level, knowing only the current and past relative prices, and the past price
levels? As they have rational expectations, they eﬃciently use all the avail-
able information. They use their data in an ordinary least square regression
allowing them to ﬁnd the best estimator of the current general price level.
One of the direct consequences of the Lucas's model is that if the volatility
of general price level is high, agents tend to attribute a greater part of the
observed increase of their relative price to inﬂation. If one push the interpre-
tation a bit further, a discretionary monetary authority which often changes
the price level in a non stable way is likely to have no real eﬀect and to push
inﬂation higher. Economic agents adapt to such policy and change their
perception of the part of inﬂation in an increase of their relative price.
Generally speaking, the role of agents' reaction in the face of changes in
economic policy is crucial for Lucas. It is the point underlined by the famous
`Lucas Critique' (Lucas, 1976). The argument was directed against the possi-
bility for traditional macroeconometric models to correctly predict the eﬀects
of alternative economic policies in quantitative terms. Lucas introduced the
problem in the following way:
11 If a producer sees its own price grow, he will choose to produce more, because the real
wage of his workers has fallen.
12 The Lucas's model could be partially summed up by a simple equation, the `Lucas
supply function': yt = yNt + α[pt − pet ], α > 0 where yt is the current growth rate, yNt
the normal growth rate, pt inﬂation and p
e
t inﬂation expected with the information of
the last period. We well see the role played by `monetary surprises'.
12
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These contentions [in the theory of economic policy] will be based
not on deviations between estimated and true structure prior to a
policy change but on the deviation between the prior true structure
and the true structure prevailing afterward. (Lucas, 1976, p.20)
Model parameters estimated on past data, which are determined by a pre-
vious economic policy, are no longer correct if the economic policy changes:
in one word, a correctly identiﬁed model cannot include decision rules that
are invariant of the economic policies. The mechanism underlying the varia-
tion of parameters is the individual behavior (the rules governing individual
decisions), which take into account economic policies and so change along
with the policy regimes. Indeed, Lucas (1976) essentially consists on a pre-
scriptive statement about the right way of modeling that would produce a
sound quantitative evaluation of the distinct eﬀects of alternative policies.
However, Lucas's paper holds a positive scope too13. It represents a way
to understand the simultaneous rise of inﬂation and unemployment in the
1970s. The paper constitutes an attack against `the inference that perma-
nent inﬂation will therefore induce a permanent economic high' which `has
[recently] undergone the mysterious transformation from obvious fallacy to
cornerstone of the theory of economic policy' (Lucas, 1976, p.257). Implic-
itly, Lucas considers that the belief in a long-term trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
and unemployment was at the heart of economic policy in the 1960s. Yet,
this belief relied on the ignorance by economists of agents' reaction to eco-
nomic policies which rendered irrelevant `theory of economic policy'. And
so, it is not striking to interpret the Lucas Critique as aiming at making
the Keynesian policy-advisers responsible for stagﬂation. The implicit idea
would be that the U.S. government and the FED, inﬂuenced by Keynesian
economists, implemented an expansive policy in the 1960s. But with time,
private agents adapted their behavior to this new policy regime and antici-
pated its implementation. Monetary policy became ineﬃcient and inﬂation
expectations were pushed higher.
Actually, this interpretation was reinforced a few years later by Lucas, in
a paper co-authored with Thomas Sargent, called `After Keynesian Macroe-
conomics' (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). This paper provided the opportunity
for Lucas to extend the scope of his Critique in a more positive direction.
The Lucas Critique led to accuse Keynesian models for having underesti-
mated the role of optimizing behavior and expectations when new economic
policies were implemented. From that perspective, according to Lucas and
Sargent, the early 1970s have represented a key test for the relevance of the
13 For a further analysis of the Lucas Critique and its positive scope, see Goutsmedt et al.
(2015).
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Keynesian models, especially from the point of view of the predicted trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and unemployment:
The models of the late 1960s predicted a sustained unemploy-
ment rate in the United States of 4 percent as consistent with a
4 percent annual rate of inﬂation. Many economists at that time
urged a deliberate policy of inﬂation on the basis of this predic-
tion. [...] the inﬂationary bias on average of monetary and ﬁscal
policy in this period should, according to all of these models, have
produced the lowest average unemployment rates for any decade
since the 1940s. In fact, as we know, they produced the highest
unemployment since the 1930s. This was econometric failure on
a grand scale. (Lucas and Sargent, 1979, p.6, our emphasis)
Lucas repeated the same claim in an other paper REEEF. Defending the
empirical relevance of his Critique and underlining `the faulty treatment of
expectations in [modern macroeconomic] models', he concluded by what he
regarded as a fatal argument : `let me cite the most graphic illustration:
our experience during the recent "stagﬂation"' (Lucas, 1981, p.221). The
expansionist policies of the 1960s represented a kind of `policy experiment'
with an outcome `too clear to require a detailed review' (Ibid.)14.
Even if Lucas and Sargent refused to attribute the failure of 1970s eco-
nomic policies to Keynesian macroeconometric models  Certainly the er-
ratic `ﬁts and starts' character of actual U.S. policy in the 1970s cannot be
attributed to recommendations based on Keynesian models (Lucas and Sar-
gent, 1979, p.6)  no doubt that they inspired their followers who defend the
`ideas hypothesis'.
the work of Lucas  and other New Classical economists  contains a way
of reasoning that puts Keynesian economic ideas in the dock. The models
which included these ideas and which were used for economic policy evalu-
ation did not integrate the potential agents reaction to change in economic
policy. And so policy makers regarded the Phillips Curve as stable, believ-
ing that they could maintain a low unemployment without increasing too
much inﬂation. Besides, if inﬂation would start to be worrying, they sup-
posed that it would be suﬃcient to reduce money creation. However, such a
discreationary policy increased volatility and agents began to anticipate it.
14 Miller and Rolnick (1980, p.191) clearly stated the point too. `Anticipated changes
to more stimulative policies, then, might explain why the observed Phillips Curve has
shifted up since the early 1960s', they claimed, in a paper attacking the Congress
Budget Oﬃce model, and published in the journal of the District Federal Reserve of
Minneapolis.
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They changed their behavior via intertemporal substitution and monetary
policy lost its real eﬀect. Expansionary policies just pushed inﬂation higher
and the unemployment rise because of a decrease in the real wage  workers
preferred to work less now because leisure was cheaper. That is the implicit
Lucas tale for the stagﬂation. Contrary to Lucas, the purpose of Sargent was
a bit more explicit on inﬂation and the U.S situation in the 1970s.
2.2 Sargent and inﬂation
Inﬂation is a subject of major interest for Sargent: he published a twice-
reedited collection of articles, called Rational Expectations and Inﬂation. He
explained in the preface to the ﬁrst edition that he aimed at `putting rational
expectations macroeconomics to work at an informal, noneconometric level
in order to describe and interpret some recent and historical economic events'
(Sargent, 2013, p.xxi). The Sargent's approach was a realist one and he used
a `rational expectations theory of inﬂation' to bring some light on interesting
historical events.
The most famous paper of this collection, `The ends of four big inﬂa-
tions', was ﬁrst published in Hall (1982). Sargent studied how some periods
of hyperinﬂation came to an end in diﬀerent countries. He regarded such
examples as `laboratories for the study of regime changes' and considered
that they are `consistent with the "`rational expectations"' view but [...] dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with the "`momentum"' model of inﬂation' (Sargent, 1982,
p.43). Its target was clearly the `momentum' theory of inﬂation, defended by
Keynesian, and claiming that any attempt for running a disinﬂation policy
in the 1970s would be costly.
The formal model of inﬂation he had in mind followed the famous article
of Cagan (1956) on the German hyperinﬂation episode, in whom he added
the Rational Expectations hypothesis. The demand for monetary base is as
following:
Mt
pt
= α− βEt[pt+1pt ]α > β ≥ 0
where Mt is the stock of base money at time t, pt the price level, and
Et[.] is the value of [.] expected to prevail by economic agents at time t. In
this equation, the demand for money is a decreasing function of the expected
inﬂation, Et[
pt+1
pt
]. After some transformations (see Sargent, 2013, p.24), we
obtain the following expression for inﬂation :
pt =
1
α
∑∞
j=0(
β
α
)jEtMt+j
15
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.18
The price level is a function of the supply of base money expected for
today and for all the future periods. Thus, inﬂation is determined by the
perception that agents have of monetary policy. The distinction between
anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy appears again. If agents think
that the Central Bank will increase money creation, the prices will go up
(regardless the Central Bank ﬁnally do it or not). Therefore, inﬂation could
be relatively high only because agents expect that monetary policy would be
expansionist, and it is the `policy regime' chosen by the government in a long
term perspective that has an eﬀect on agents' perception:
An alternative `rational expectations' view denies that there
is any inherent momentum in the present process of inﬂation.
[...] it is held that people expect high rates of inﬂation in the
future precisely because the government's current and prospec-
tive monetary and ﬁscal policies warrant these expectations. [...]
Thus inﬂation only seems to have a momentum of its own; it is
actually the long-term government policy of persistently running
large deﬁcits and creating money at high rates that imparts the
momentum of the inﬂation rate.15 (Sargent, 1982, p.42)
The New Classical revolution has produced a kind of psychological turn
in macroeconomics. I will analyze in the next section how `credibility' plays
a crucial role for Sargent in any attempt to reduce inﬂation. But the time
inconsistency literature equally appeals to some psychological ideas, as cred-
ibility too, or reputation.
2.3 The time inconsistency issue
According to Snowdon and Vane (2005, p.250), `dynamic consistency
problems have now become the leading theories of moderate inﬂation'. The
time inconsistency problem was ﬁrst introduced by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) in a game theoretic model with strategic agents adopting a forward-
looking behavior. They dismissed the use of control theory in economic policy
evaluation and the paper could thus be seen as a complementary piece of work
with Lucas (1976). In the standard theory of economic policy at that time,
the use of control theory  advocated for example by Tinbergen (1952)  was
15 It is worth noting that Sargent also paid attention to the role of public deﬁcits in
generating the inﬂation of the 1970s. One of the two fundamental principles that he
advocated in the preface to the ﬁrst edition of Rational Expectations and Inﬂation is
that the monetary policy should not be separately thought from ﬁscal policy (Sargent,
2013, p.xxii). I will go back to the issue in the next section.
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crucial16. Kydland and Prescott (1977, p.474) argued that control theory is
only relevant if the movement of the economic system simply depends on the
current state of the system as well as current and past policy decisions. If
the agents in the economic system are forward-looking and if they take into
consideration policy decisions, then control theory is inappropriate for policy
planning.
The game theoretical model built by Kydland and Prescott could be sum-
marized in an intuitive story. In an economy with an expectational Phillips
Curve, the Central Bank announces that the monetary base growth rate will
be ﬁxed at its optimal value for every period  the value that warrants the
maximization of the social welfare function for all the periods. If agents be-
lieve this policy, inﬂation will be at the optimal level targeted by the Central
Bank and unemployment at its natural rate. However, in the next periods,
the Central Bank has an interest to renege and to run an expansionary pol-
icy to diminish unemployment. We talk about time inconsistency because
the optimal policy in the following periods is not the same as in the ﬁrst
period. Having rational expectations, private agents know that the Central
Bank would not bind its action to the optimal policy announced in the ﬁrst
period: `the announcements can have no credibility in the ﬁrst place' (Black-
burn, 1987, p.113) and inﬂation will be higher than targeted. The conclusion
was clear for Kydland and Prescott: `stabilization eﬀorts have the perverse
eﬀect of contributing to economic instability.[...] active stabilization may
very well be dangerous and it is best that it not be attempted' (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977, p.487). As long as the monetary authority is not bound
by some strict rules, there exists an inﬂationary bias. It is not the money
creation by discretionary policies which generates inﬂation, but more deeply
that monetary authority has the possibility of implementing a discretionary
policy at any time.
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) popularized the time inconsistency problem
in a model in whom they added the issue of the ruler's reputation. In the
absence of binding rules, the monetary authority could have interest to main-
tain the initial optimal policy to warrant its own reputation. Every deviation
16 Snowdon and Vane (2005, p.250) deﬁne control theory in a literary way as follows:
First, the policy maker must specify the targets or goals of economic
policy (for example, low inﬂation and unemployment). Second, given this
social welfare function which the policy maker is attempting to maximize,
a set of instruments (monetary and ﬁscal) is chosen which will be used
to achieve the targets. Finally, the policy maker must make use of an
economic model so that the instruments may be set at their optimal values.
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from the ﬁrst period optimal policy leads to a `punishment' by private agents
which expect higher inﬂation rates. In Barro and Gordon's own words, `a
diﬀerent form of equilibrium may emerge in which the policymaker forgoes
short-term gains for the sake of maintaining a long-term reputation' (Barro
and Gordon, 1983b). According to Robert Barro, this model had not only
a normative goal  the promotion of binding rule policy  but it brought a
positive theory of inﬂation:
Aside from predicting 'high' average inﬂation and monetary
growth, the model indicates the reactions to changes in the ben-
eﬁts from unexpected inﬂation or in the costs of actual inﬂation.
For example, a rise in the natural rate of unemployment can raise
the beneﬁts from lowering unemployment through surprise inﬂa-
tion. It follows that a secular rise in the natural unemployment
rate will lead to a secular rise in the mean rates of monetary
growth and inﬂation. (Barro, 1986, p.26)
It was not a mere coincidence if the literature on time inconsistency was
born and knew such an ascent at the end of the 1970s. It was interpreted as
a good way for explaining a high average inﬂation regime, as it was the case
in the U.S. It is still used today for accounting of the situation of that period
(see Romer 2001, chapter 10, or Chappell et al. 2005, chapter 10). Once
again the perception of economic policy by private agents is crucial. Do they
think that the announcement of the authority is credible ? Is its reputation
suﬃcient for private agents to be conﬁdent and to expect a lower inﬂation
rate17? The time inconsistency issue also introduced a more institutional
way of thinking in macroeconomics. Macroeconomists have to care about the
institutional design of public authorities, in order to maximize the outcome
of their policies  I will go back to the issue in the next section. In the
1960s and 1970s, ﬁscal and monetary authorities were supposed to be badly
designed: ﬁne-tuning has created an unstable environment that made the
public institutions non-credible. The U.S. economy was stuck in a high-
inﬂation equilibrium.
We now have several elements on the New Classical speech on stagﬂation.
Such an analysis enabled them to formulate  more or less explicitly  some
17 Backus and Driﬃll (1985) introduced an interesting reﬁnement. They imagine that
there exist two types of Central Bank: a conservative one, and a more expansionist one.
In order to maximize its social welfare function, the second type could have interest to
mimic the actions of the conservative Central Bank to mislead private agents. Its policy
would be more credible and it would renege its commitment with more beneﬁts in the
future.
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political propositions. Propositions which  though some similarities with
monetarist ones  represented an original program, as I will show in the next
section.
3 A New Classical political program ?
In its book on the New Classical school, Hoover (1988, chapter 9) won-
dered if the New Classical school could be legitimately labeled `monetarism
mark II' as James Tobin (1980b, 1981) claimed it. Despite some obvious the-
oretical diﬀerences, the monetarists and the New Classical economists shared
on the whole a similar view on economic policy, either in their common reject
of ﬁne-tuning and too active stabilization policy or in the defense of policy
rules. In commenting its `only policy paper' called `Rules, Discretion, and the
Role of the Economic Advisor' (Lucas, 1980b), Lucas himself acknowledged
the political proximity with Milton Friedman: `This must have been a dis-
appointment to those in attendance who believed that rational expectations
imply an entirely new point of view on policy' (Lucas, 1981, p.17).
However, that is not to say that there existed no diﬀerence between the
monetarist and New classical schools. A major diﬀerence lied in disinﬂation
policies and the estimated value of the sacriﬁce ratio18. If `inﬂation is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it can be produced
only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output'
(Friedman, 1970), inﬂation has to be reduced by decreasing the growth rate
of the money supply. However, such a reduction would be costly and would
increase the level of unemployment.This is what has pushed some monetarists
to defend a gradualist policy, that is to say a progressive slowing down of the
growth rate of the money supply (Snowdon and Vane, 2005, pp.182-185). The
New Classical economists are in some sense more optimistic on the sacriﬁce
ratio issue. Once again the psychological dimension of their analysis plays
a central role: if a disinﬂation policy is credible, inﬂation expectations can
`jump' downwards and the policy will be costless. It is the heart of the
argumentation of Sargent (1982) on disinﬂation policies, as we will see in a
ﬁrst time. However, we will see that inﬂuencing the perception of private
agents is not regarded as so simple by the New Classical school and that the
economic program they defended actually was rather a long-term program.
18 The sacriﬁce ratio is a measure of the unemployment or output costs of reducing the
inﬂation rate. Diﬀerent measures of the sacriﬁce ratio exist (see, for instance, Ball
1994).
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3.1 Assessing the sacriﬁce ratio
Disorientated in the fog of the stagﬂation, economists searched for orig-
inal solution to ﬁght inﬂation without imposing a cost too high for society.
Friedman (1974) defended the use of indexation under certain conditions
to make easier the downward adjustment of inﬂation. Keynesians, through
the Council of Economic Advisers, advocated income policy to reduce inﬂa-
tion without implementing too restrictive monetary and ﬁscal policies (Okun
1977). One of the representants of the New Classical school, Preston Miller,
rose against the use of income policy in a paper published in the journal of
the FED of Minneapolis. He claimed that `incomes policies, therefore, are
very expansive as both a tax and an inﬂation ﬁghter, and we should be wary
of using them' (Miller, 1978, p.15). There is no need to search for miracle so-
lution whereas the standard tools remains relevant: `the government should
rely on normal ways to get resources. And it should use the only proven way
to control inﬂation: sound monetary and ﬁscal policies' (Ibid.).
For New Classical economists, reducing inﬂation in the 1970s was not
as costly as it seemed. It was the point of Sargent (1982) who rejected the
pessimistic assessment of some Keynesian economists. Sargent refused the
highest estimations of the sacriﬁce ratio because they relied on models that
did not take into account the strategic interrelations between the ruler and
private agents, and the fact that the later could change its behavior in func-
tion of the former actions : `an implication of this view is that inﬂation can
be stopped much more quickly than advocates of the `momentum' view have
indicated and that their estimates of the length of time and the costs of stop-
ping inﬂation in terms of foregone output [...] are erroneous' (Sargent, 1982,
p.42). The crucial element for a successful disinﬂation policy is its credibility
in the eyes of private agents. But this does not mean that credibility is easy
to acquired.
In the collection Rational Expectations and Inﬂation, Sargent carried out
analyses of several historical or contemporary disinﬂation policies. In addi-
tion of the hyperinﬂation cases of Sargent (1982), he studied the disinﬂation
policies of Poincare, Thatcher, or Reagan. A list of the preconditions needed
for a successful disinﬂation policy according to Sargent can thus be estab-
lished. He claimed that `the `measure' that would accomplish this would be
a once-and-for-all, widely understood, and widely agreed upon change in the
monetary or ﬁscal policy regime' (Sargent, 2013, p.114, I underline). A ﬁrst
fundamental precondition for credibility is thus the understanding of the pol-
icy by private agents, what put special emphasis of the ability for the public
authority to communicate about its actions19. The `agreement' condition
19 The question of credibility has led to the development of a large literature on the com-
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makes reference to a more political issue: do the whole government, the po-
litical parties, the diﬀerent economic institutions agree on the implemented
policy?
The last point is linked with what Thomas Sargent regarded as a crucial
question: `monetary and ﬁscal policies must be coordinated' (Sargent, 2013,
p.xxii). It led Sargent to consider at the time he wrote `Reaganomics and
Credibility' (republished in Sargent 2013) that Reagan's disinﬂation policy
would be a failure. Despite some `announcement eﬀects', the policy of Reagan
was `incredible' because `it was simply not feasible simultaneously to carry
out both the ﬁscal and the monetary aspects of Reaganomics' (Sargent, 2013,
p.34)20. To insure the credibility of their policy, public authorities have to
ﬁx a consistent `policy regime', what implies to exclude 'isolated actions' and
`temporary departures' (Sargent, 2013, p.39). To `eradicate inﬂation' in the
1970s, Sargent considered that:
It would require far more than a few temporary restrictive
ﬁscal and monetary actions. It would require a change in the
policy regime: There must be an abrupt change in the continuing
government policy, or strategy, for setting deﬁcits now and in
the future that is suﬃciently binding as to be widely believed.
(Sargent, 1982, p.42)
What determines the cost of such a disinﬂation policy? The more `resolute
and evident the government's commitment' (Ibid.) would be, the quicker
inﬂation would fall and the less costly the policy would be in terms of output.
We see that the criteria for success are not so clear and that it is not easy
to determine the potential credibility of a policy. Ironically, it seems in a
ﬁrst time that New Classical economists are more optimistic on the cost of
disinﬂation policy, but in the same time, it depends on so many conditions
that there is no guarantee for success in the short-term. Actually, it seems
more coherent to see the New Classical propositions as a long-term economic
program.
3.2 A long-term economic program?
The New Classical economists displayed a rather pessimistic view on the
possibilities of economic policy in the short-term  pessimistic position that
munication about economic policies (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Stein, 1989; Cukierman
and Tommasi, 1998)
20 At the beginning of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan's government ran ﬁscal deﬁcits and
Sargent considered that `rational observers' would realize that such a policy would not
be feasible in the long-term: the Federal Reserve would be forced to create more money
to ﬁnance these deﬁcits.
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relied on their opposition to discretionary policies. In a sense the New Clas-
sical economists considered that in wanting to make the things better, the
ruler actually run the risk of making the things worst. Coming back to
the models developed with Gordon, Barro (1986, p.28) formulated a kind of
paradox on economic policy: `the pursuit of the ﬁrst-best tends to push the
economy away from the second best of a rule with low inﬂation, and toward
the third best of discretionary policy with high inﬂation'. In wanting to
obtain the best social outcome, governments and Central Banks allow them-
selves to implement discretionary policies, what leads to an inﬂationary bias
and a `third best' solution in terms of social welfare. Lucas noticed likewise
with disappointment the prevalence of short-term discretionary policies in
the economists' toolbox. Yet, it pushed public economists to search for mira-
cle solution that relied on `the promise of particular results but without basis
in either theory or historical experience' (Lucas, 1980b, p.204). In fact, the
stagﬂation commanded economists to become aware of their imprisonment
in a certain way of thinking economic policy:
Economists who pose this `what is to be done, today?' ques-
tion as though it were somehow the acid test of economic compe-
tence are culture-bound (or institution-bound) to an extent they
are probably not aware of. They are accepting as given the en-
tirely unproved hypothesis that the ﬁne-tuning exercise called for
by the Employment Act is a desirable and feasible one. (Lucas,
1980b, p.208)
According to Lucas, this way of thinking was determined by some eco-
nomic `institutions' as the Employment Act of 1946 or the Federal Reserve
Act of the 1930s, that had encouraged public authorities to favor the ﬁght
against unemployment at the expense of the prices stability. The stagﬂa-
tion was the proof that `the history of monetary and ﬁscal institutions, in
the United-States and elsewhere, is one of repeated failure, and failure at
very high cost' (Lucas, 1980b, p.202-203). These institutions made citizens
think that ﬁne-tuning was feasible and desirable. The Rational Expectations
framework allowed to reject this belief and helped to design new aims for
economic policy:
An alternative response is to attempt to make clear to our
fellow citizens the questions that currently available expertise can
hope to answer successfully [...] and to make it as clear as possible
that the main task of monetary and ﬁscal policy is to provide
a stable, predictable environment for the private sector of the
economy. (Lucas, 1980b, p.209-210, I underline)
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The setting up of a predictable environment imposes to create some limi-
tations for economic policy21. Lucas underlined some progress in this line in
the United-States at the end of the 1970s. He cited the California's Propo-
sition 13 that put into the legislation a limitation on property taxes (Lucas,
1980b, p.204). Indeed, Lucas was a clear partisan of the constitutionaliza-
tion of some economic rules, such as the limitation of the federal budget
deﬁcit, promoting the work of Buchanan and Wagner (1977)22. On the mon-
etary policy side, he approved the House Concurrent Resolution 133, that
imposed `the Federal Reserve Board [to] announce monetary growth targets
in advance and [to] account for deviations afterward' (Lucas, 1980b, p.208).
The general picture that is emerging gives to economic policy the role
of the culprit for the disturbances occurred in the 1970s. If one wanted to
cure the U.S. economy, one had to limit the damages caused by discretionary
policies. It is as if the oil and other supply shocks have played no role during
the period. Similarly, the New Classical political propositions focused on
inﬂation at the expense of the unemployment level. In the next section I will
try to understand why these two elements were pushed to the background.
4 Unemployment and oil shocks, the two miss-
ing pieces in the story
In the second part of the 1970s, some macroeconomists tried to `save' the
Phillips curve, bringing in the same time an explanation of the stagﬂation.
The contributions of Gordon (1977, 1984) or Phelps (1978) would become the
21 Lucas considered by the way that it was in this perspective that citizens would be the
more likely to impose their wish:
In policies of either type, it is evidently impossible for large numbers
of people to form opinions and exercise inﬂuence at anything like the level
of detail at which legislators and economic managers and their advisors
carry on their discussion. In contrast, it is clearly possible for people to
impose limits on these technical discussions, to bound levels and rates of
change of economic aggregates. Public opinion generally can do little to
guide the exercise of discretionary economic authority, but it has enormous
potential to limit its scope. (Lucas, 1980b, p.204-205)
22 Sargent (2013, p.36-37) also defended this point when he claimed that `the responsibil-
ities of the monetary and ﬁscal authorities [have] to be legislatively or constitutionally
restricted' in a way that enables to determine `which institutions are to lead and which
are to follow'. For a discussion of the role of `constitutionalism' as a solution of time-
inconsistency problems, see Drazen (2002, pp.134-37).
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foundations of what is called the `Triangle model'. As the demand elasticity
of oil was less than one, the oil shocks led both to an increase in the general
price level and to a recession. The general inertia of prices  due to some
rigidities in wage and price setting and to the input-output supply chain that
generates a certain duration in the transmission of inﬂation  extended the
eﬀects of the initial shocks over time. According to New Classical economists,
the high average inﬂation in the 1970s had no links with the supply shocks
which had only produced temporary inﬂation.
When Snowdon and Vane asked Robert Lucas what he thought about
these kinds of models which enabled to save the Phillips Curve and to ex-
plain the stagﬂation by supply shocks, he simply answered that `the direct
eﬀect of the OPEC shock was minor in [his] opinion' (Snowdon and Vane,
1998, p.126). The same lack of interest for supply shocks could be found
in Barro (1976), at the end of his analysis of the eﬀects of anticipated and
unanticipated monetary shocks:
The approach in this paper argues that there is no role for
monetary policy in oﬀsetting these real shifts. Adverse shifts like
oil and agricultural crises will reduce output and cause painful
relative adjustments no matter what the reaction of the mon-
etary authority. Added monetary noise would only complicate
and lengthen the process of adjustment. (Barro, 1976, p.26)
The ﬁrst conclusion was a pessimistic one in terms of stabilization policies:
monetary policy could do nothing if a supply shock occurred. Worse, if the
monetary authority tries to limit the negative consequences of a shock, it
will increase the volatility of the money supply, what is likely to increase
the average inﬂation. The implicit idea was that in searching to ﬁght the oil
shocks, the Federal Reserve (and the government) has simply worsened the
situation.
Few years after Gordon (1977) had introduced supply shocks in an ex-
pectational Phillips Curve and Lawrence Klein (1978) had defended  as the
annual president of the American Economic Association  the necessity for a
better understanding of the `supply side' part of the economic system, Lucas
seemed to regard these developments as a reactionary behavior in front of
the current events. The Keynesians preferred to consider that the forecast
errors of their models in the 1970s was the result of `a neglect in controlling
for some other factors which, when properly taken into account, reveal the
original basic structure to be sound' whereas it was in fact `a symptom of
much deeper problems' (Lucas, 1980b, p.203)23. The extension of the Phillips
23 Lucas expressed also its doubts on the empirical validity of considering inﬂation in the
24
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.18
Figure 6: Scatter plot of the unemployment and inﬂation rates, quarterly
data, 1960-1980 (Gordon, 2011)
Curve to integrate supply shocks was just an artifact to hide the fact that
the Keynesian models went wrong and had encouraged discretionary policies
which were the major determinant of the 1970s inﬂation.
According to the New Classical economists, supply shocks represented
just a secondary cause of the inﬂation of the 1970s. If one want to understand
the stagﬂation, one must take a look on the consequences of discretionary
economic policies. However, we can notice that the New Classical story was
pretty clear to explain how these policies, via the changes in private agents
expectations, led to higher inﬂation, but that the links with the rise in the
unemployment level were not so explicit.
The Figure 6 displays a clear negative relationship between inﬂation and
the rate of unemployment in the 1960s. The correlation seems to become
1970s as mostly the result of supply shocks:
The idea that virtually all of this period was characterized by `excess
supply' and hence that virtually all of the inﬂation must be attributable to
`supply shocks' does not seem to be worth taking seriously and I have yet
to see a quantitative case for this position made. (This is, of course, not
to say that there have not been serious supply shocks over the decade)'
Lucas (1980a, p.705-706).
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rather positive in the 1970s. It is clear that the average unemployment level
rose, meaning in principle that the natural rate of unemployment should have
risen. How could we explain the rise of unemployment in a New Classical
framework? If we follow the work of Lucas (see the second section), it has to
be the consequence of an intertemporal substitution: in front of the change
of their real wage, workers prefer to work less today. However, in this per-
spective, the unemployment rate should decrease in the next periods. Yet, it
was not the case in the 1970s, what implies that a deepest mechanism was
at stake: it was not the trade-oﬀ of intertemporal leisure which has changed
consequently to a change in real wages, but the workers' preferences them-
selves that have evolved. But Lucas did not bring out any explanation for
this change in preferences.
There exists another tricky problem in Lucas's reasoning. If after a de-
crease of real wages the workers consider that their wage is not suﬃcient
and prefer to wait for better oﬀers, that means that the rise in unemploy-
ment is the consequence of resignations  workers have chosen to quit their
job. However, during recession unemployment is the result of an increase in
layoﬀs. That's one of the principal ﬂaw in the New Classical explanation of
unemployment as Blinder (1987, p.131) or Gordon (1976, p.196) have pointed
out.
Actually, this weakness in New Classical Macroeconomics was the result
of a more general trend impulse by the Natural Rate Hypothesis; a trend
that was well summed up by Lucas himself:
The eﬀect it does have on normative discussion is twofold.
First, it focuses discussion of monetary and ﬁscal policy on sta-
bilization, on the pursuit of price stability and on minimizing the
disruptive eﬀects of erratic policy changes. Some average unem-
ployment rate would, of course, emerge from such a policy but
as a by-product, not as a preselected target. Second, by thinking
of this natural rate as an equilibrium emerging from voluntary
ex-change in the usual sense, one can subject it to the scrutiny
of modern methods of public ﬁnance. (Lucas, 1978, p.356)
The ﬁrst subject is the realm of macroeconomists, whereas the second is
the one of labor economics, welfare economic and public ﬁnance. It deals
with the explanation of the natural rate of unemployment (or the long-term
rate) which depends, for instance, on the regulations of the labor market
or the level of insurance for unemployed. It could be interesting to assess
with scrutiny how the New Classical framework has helped to redesign the
partition of tasks for policymakers, but for Gordon (1976) the consequences
were rather clear:
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The Council of Economic Advisers was now to be divided into
two independent branches, one group of labor economists which
would tally up the costs and beneﬁts of manpower programs de-
signed to shift the natural unemployment rate, on which mone-
tary and ﬁscal policies by themselves had no eﬀect, and a second
group of monetary economists which determined the optimum
rate of inﬂation as a function of the growth rate of real output
and the interest rate paid on money, and the marginal cost of
levying conventional taxes. (Gordon, 1976, p.191-92)
In a certain sense the unemployment issue was pushed away of the macroe-
conomics ﬁeld. By an ironical reversal comparing to the birth of macroeco-
nomics, explaining why the level of unemployment change in average in the
1970s was not the prerogative of the macroeconomist anymore. Consequently,
the incapacity of New Classical macroeconomics to explain convincingly one
of the standard features of the stagﬂation  that is to say the durable rise of
unemployment  could not be considered as a true ﬂaw. It became the task
of the `new economics of labor' (Phelps, 1968; Mortensen, 1970a,b, 1976).
Conclusion
The study of the New Classical works above enables to outline a general
chain of argumentation for accounting of the 1970s economic events. The
ﬁrst impulse is a political one: the 1960s and the 1970s were characterized
by expansive discretionary policies to maintain the unemployment rate at a
low level. Such policies were based upon the economic belief in a permanent
trade-oﬀ (the menu of policy of Samuelson and Solow 1960) between inﬂation
and unemployment. Policymakers considered that one could maintain a low
rate of unemployment in exchange of a few more points in the inﬂation rate,
but keeping this inﬂation suﬃciently low to avoid strong disturbances. The
fundamental trigger element was monetary policy. The federal deﬁcits played
a role in encouraging the Fed to ﬁnance these deﬁcits (or in letting the agents
supposed that the Fed would do it at some point).
Discretionary policies increased the volatility of the money supply, pro-
ducing an inﬂationary bias. Inﬂation was higher in average because agents
expected that the Fed would use its discretionary powers and that the inﬂa-
tion rate would rise. Such a policy regime strengthened people in their belief
that inﬂation would remain high and that is this perception which maintain
it elevated. The supply shocks alone could not have such a durable eﬀect on
inﬂation.
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If one wanted to diminish the average inﬂation, the only solution was to
change the policy regime. Public authorities had build a consistent overall
policy which would be credible for private agents. It implied a high coordina-
tion between ﬁscal and monetary policies, and the respect of some economic
rules for a time in order to establish the ruler's reputation. This reputation
would render the disinﬂation policy more credible and so more eﬃcient.
Such a summary of the potential mechanisms at stake during the stagﬂa-
tion phenomenon represents without any doubt an extrapolation of the New
Classical models, because the New Classical claims were never as explicit
on the 1970s event. But I think that it is in a certain way a faithful re-
construction of their ideas. We see easily that expectations and perception
of economic policy play a leading role in economic mechanisms for the New
Classical economists.
The central place occupied by these psychological ideas in macroeco-
nomics demonstrate a sort of dematerialization in the discipline. Oil shocks
and energy in general stay outside of the analytical framework of macroe-
conomics. The role of energy in the process of production, the question
of exhaustion and ﬂow constraints do not represent a subject for modern
standard macroeconomics24. Paradoxically, the 1970s energy crisis did not
reinforce the place of energy in macroeconomics.
The place of expectations in the New Classical school and in modern
macroeconomics raises a second paradox. The Rational Expectations hy-
pothesis constitutes an indirect way for treating expectations. The assump-
tion is defended as an `as if' hypothesis and macroeconomists do not search
how do agents form their expectations in the `real world'25. New Classical ex-
planations appeal largely to psychological phenomena, but without entering
into the psychological details of agents' behavior. Such explanations can thus
look like a black box, what leaves the door opened for further reﬁnements
(see, for example Sims (2009) on the Rational Inattention which represents
an alternative way for modeling forward-looking expectations).
24 It is not fair to claim that oil prices are always an `exogenous' factor in macroeconomics.
Barsky and Kilian (2002) or Kilian (2009) endogenized the price of oil in a `monetary-
expectational framework' in accordance with New Classical insights. They claimed that
the oil shocks were partially a consequence of the monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s
25 The section III of Goutsmedt et al. (2015) deals with this issue.
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